|
| Stop the Break-Ins! The majority of successful attacks on computer systems via the
Internet can be traced to exploitation of one of a small number of security flaws. Most of
the systems compromised in the Solar Sunrise Pentagon hacking incident were attacked
through a single vulnerability. A related flaw was exploited to break into many of the
computers later used in massive distributed denial of service attacks. Recent compromises
of Windows NT-based web servers are typically traced to entry via a well-known
vulnerability. Another vulnerability is widely thought to be the means used to compromise
more than 30,000 Linux systems.
A few software vulnerabilities account for the majority of successful attacks because
attackers are opportunistic – taking the easiest and most convenient route. They
exploit the best-known flaws with the most effective and widely available attack tools.
They count on organizations not fixing the problems, and they often attack
indiscriminately, by scanning the Internet for vulnerable systems.
System administrators report that they have not corrected these flaws because they
simply do not know which of over 500 potential problems are the ones that are most
dangerous, and they are too busy to correct them all.
The information security community is meeting this problem head on by identifying the
most critical Internet security problem areas – the clusters of vulnerabilities that
system administrators need to eliminate immediately. This consensus Top Ten list
represents an unprecedented example of active cooperation among industry, government, and
academia. The participants came together from the most security-conscious federal
agencies, from the leading security software vendors and consulting firms, from the top
university-based security programs, and from CERT/CC and the SANS Institute. A complete
list of participants may be found at the end of this article.
Here is the experts’ list of the Ten Most Often Exploited Internet Security Flaws
along with the actions needed to rid your systems of these vulnerabilities.
Three Notes For Readers:
Note 1. This is a living document. It includes initial, step-by-step instructions and
pointers for correcting the flaws. We will update these instructions as more current or
convenient methods are identified and we welcome your input. This is a community consensus
document – your experience in eliminating the vulnerabilities can help others who
come after you. To make suggestions e-mail info@sans.org
with the subject Top Ten Comments. To get the latest version of the guidelines, e-mail info@sans.org with the subject Top Ten Fixes.
Note 2. You’ll find references to CVE numbers – the Common Vulnerabilities
and Exposures reference numbers that correspond with vulnerabilities. CAN numbers are
candidates for CVE entries that are not yet fully verified. For more data on the
award-winning CVE project, see http://cve.mitre.org.
Note 3. At the end of the list, you’ll find an extra section offering a list of
the ports used by commonly probed and attacked services. By blocking traffic to those
ports at the firewall or other network perimeter protection device, you add an extra layer
of defense that helps protect you from configuration mistakes.
|
| 1. BIND weaknesses:
nxt, qinv and in.named allow immediate root compromise. |
| The Berkeley Internet Name Domain (BIND) package is the most widely
used implementation of Domain Name Service (DNS) -- the critical means by which we all
locate systems on the Internet by name (e.g., www.sans.org) without having to know
specific IP addresses -- and this makes it a favorite target for attack. Sadly, according
to a mid-1999 survey, about 50% of all DNS servers connected to the Internet are running
vulnerable versions of BIND. In a typical example of a BIND attack, intruders erased the
system logs, and installed tools to gain administrative access. They then compiled and
installed IRC utilities and network scanning tools, which they used to scan more than a
dozen class-B networks in search of additional systems running vulnerable versions of
BIND. In a matter of minutes, they had used the compromised system to attack hundreds of
remote systems abroad, resulting in many additional successful compromises. This
illustrates the chaos that can result from a single vulnerability in the software for
ubiquitous Internet services such as DNS. |
Systems Affected:
Multiple UNIX and Linux systems
As of May 22, 2000, any version earlier than BIND v.8.2.2 patch level 5 is vulnerable.CVE Entries:
nxt CVE-1999-0833
qinv CVE-1999-0009
Other related entries: CVE-1999-0835, CVE-1999-0848, CVE-1999-0849, CVE-1999-0851
Advice on correcting the problem:
A. Disable the BIND name daemon (named) on all systems that are not authorized to be DNS
servers. Some experts recommend you also remove the DNS software.
B. On machines that are authorized DNS servers, update to the latest version and patch
level (as of May 22, 2000, latest version was 8.2.2 patch level 5) Use the guidance
contained in the following advisories:
For the NXT vulnerability: http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-99-14-bind.html
For the QINV (Inverse Query) and NAMED vulnerabilities: http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-98.05.bind_problems.html
http://www.cert.org/summaries/CS-98.04.html
C. Run BIND as a non-privileged user for protection in the event of future
remote-compromise attacks. (However, only processes running as root can be configured to
use ports below 1024 – a requirement for DNS. Therefore you must configure BIND to
change the user-id after binding to the port.)
D. Run BIND in a chroot()ed directory structure for protection in the event of future
remote-compromise attacks. |
| 2. Vulnerable CGI
programs and application extensions (e.g., ColdFusion) installed on web servers. |
| Most web servers support Common Gateway Interface (CGI) programs to
provide interactivity in web pages, such as data collection and verification. Many web
servers come with sample CGI programs installed by default. Unfortunately, many CGI
programmers fail to consider ways in which their programs may be misused or subverted to
execute malicious commands. Vulnerable CGI programs present a particularly attractive
target to intruders because they are relatively easy to locate, and they operate with the
privileges and power of the web server software itself. Intruders are known to have
exploited vulnerable CGI programs to vandalize web pages, steal credit card information,
and set up back doors to enable future intrusions, even if the CGI programs are secured.
When Janet Reno's picture was replaced by that of Adolph Hitler at the Department of
Justice web site, an in-depth assessment concluded that a CGI hole was the most probable
avenue of compromise. Allaire's ColdFusion is a web server application package which
includes vulnerable sample programs when installed. As a general rule, sample programs
should always be removed from production systems. |
Systems Affected:
All web servers. CVE Entries:
Sample CGI programs
CAN-1999-0736
CVE-1999-0067
CVE-1999-0068
CVE-1999-0270
CVE-1999-0346
CVE-2000-0207
Most important CGI Vulnerabilities not including sample programs
CAN-1999-0467
CAN-1999-0509
CVE-1999-0021
CVE-1999-0039
CVE-1999-0058
CVE-1999-0147
CVE-1999-0148
CVE-1999-0149
CVE-1999-0174
CVE-1999-0177
CVE-1999-0178
CVE-1999-0237
CVE-1999-0262
CVE-1999-0279
CVE-1999-0771
CVE-1999-0951
CVE-2000-0012
CVE-2000-0039
CVE-2000-0208
ColdFusion Sample Program Vulnerabilities
CAN-1999-0455
CAN-1999-0922
CAN-1999-0923
ColdFusion Other Vulnerability
CAN-1999-0760
CVE-2000-0057
Advice on correcting the problem:
A. Do not run web servers as root
B. Get rid of CGI script interpreters in bin directories:
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-96.11.interpreters_in_cgi_bin_dir.html
C. Remove unsafe CGI scripts
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-97.07.nph-test-cgi_script.html
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-96.06.cgi_example_code.html
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-97.12.webdist.html
D. Write safer CGI programs:
http://www-4.ibm.com/software/developer/library/secure-cgi/
http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/cgi_metacharacters.html
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-97.24.Count_cgi.html
E. Don't configure CGI support on Web servers that don't need it.
F. Run your Web server in a chroot()ed environment to protect the machine against yet
to be discovered exploits |
| 3. Remote Procedure
Call (RPC) weaknesses in rpc.ttdbserverd (ToolTalk), rpc.cmsd (Calendar Manager), and
rpc.statd that allow immediate root compromise |
| Remote procedure calls (RPC) allow programs on one computer to
execute programs on a second computer. They are widely-used to access network services
such as shared files in NFS. Multiple vulnerabilities caused by flaws in RPC, are being
actively exploited. There is compelling evidence that the vast majority of the distributed
denial of service attacks launched during 1999 and early 2000 were executed by systems
that had been victimized because they had the RPC vulnerabilities. The broadly successful
attack on U.S. military systems during the Solar Sunrise incident also exploited an RPC
flaw found on hundreds of Department of Defense systems. |
Systems Affected:
Multiple UNIX and Linux systemsCVE Entries:
rpc.ttdbserverd - CVE-1999-0687, CVE-1999-0003, CVE-1999-0693 (-0687 is newer than -0003,
but both allow root from remote attackers and it's likely that -0003 is still around a
LOT; -0693 is only locally exploitable, but does give root)
rpc.cmsd – CVE-1999-0696
rpc.statd - CVE-1999-0018, CVE-1999-0019.
Advice on correcting the problem:
A. Wherever possible, turn off and/or remove these services on machines directly
accessible from the Internet.
B. Where you must run them, install the latest patches:
For Solaris Software Patches:
http://sunsolve.sun.com
For IBM AIX Software
http://techsupport.services.ibm.com/support/rs6000.support/downloads
http://techsupport.services.ibm.com/rs6k/fixes.html
For SGI Software Patches:
http://www.sgi.com/support/path_intro.html
For Compaq (Digital Unix) Patches:
http://www.compaq.com/support
Search the vendor patch database for tooltalk patches and install them right away.
A summary document pointing to specific guidance about each of three principal RPC
vulnerabilities may be found at: http://www.cert.org/incident_notes/IN-99-04.html
For statdd: http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-99-05-statd-automountd.html
For ToolTalk: http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-98.11.tooltalk.html
For Calendar Manager: http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-99-08-cmsd.html
|
| 4. RDS security
hole in the Microsoft Internet Information Server (IIS). |
| Microsoft’s Internet Information Server (IIS) is the web server
software found on most web sites deployed on Microsoft Windows NT and Windows 2000
servers. Programming flaws in IIS’s Remote Data Services (RDS) are being employed by
malicious users to run remote commands with administrator privileges. Some participants
who developed the "Top Ten" list believe that exploits of other IIS flaws, such
as .HTR files, are at least as common as exploits of RDS. Prudence dictates that
organizations using IIS install patches or upgrades to correct all known IIS security
flaws when they install patches or upgrades to fix the RDS flaw. |
Systems Affected:
Microsoft Windows NT systems using Internet Information ServerCVE Entries:
CVE-1999-1011
Advice on correcting the problem:
A. Implement custom handlers AND delete the references to VBBusObj at
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/System/CurrentControlSet/Services/W3SVC/
Parameters/ADCLaunch/VbBusObj.VbBusObjCls
B. Use the information posted by Microsoft to disable the service or correct the RDS
vulnerability and all other security flaws in IIS.
http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/q184/3/75.asp
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms98-004.asp
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms99-025.asp
|
| 5. Sendmail buffer
overflow weaknesses, pipe attacks and MIMEbo, that allow immediate root compromise. |
| Sendmail is the program that sends, receives, and forwards most
electronic mail processed on UNIX and Linux computers. Sendmail’s widespread use on
the Internet makes it a prime target of attackers. Several flaws have been found over the
years. The very first advisory issued by CERT/CC in 1988 made reference to an exploitable
weakness in sendmail. In one of the most common exploits, the attacker sends a crafted
mail message to the machine running Sendmail, and Sendmail reads the message as
instructions requiring the victim machine to send its password file to the attacker’s
machine (or to another victim) where the passwords can be cracked. |
Systems Affected:
Multiple UNIX and Linux systemsCVE Entries:
CVE-1999-0047, CVE-1999-0130, CVE-1999-0131, CVE-1999-0203, CVE-1999-0204, CVE-1999-0206.
CVE-1999-0130 is locally exploitable only.
Advice on correcting the problem:
A. Implement patches for sendmail. See http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-97.05.sendmail.html
B. Do not run Sendmail in daemon mode (turn off the -bd switch) on machines that are
neither mail servers nor mail relays.
C. Consider running an alternate Mail Transfer Agent such as Postfix, QMail, or Exim.
More information may be found at www.postfix.org, www.qmail.org, www.exim.org.
(Note, however, that these programs are not transparent replacements, and may have
weaknesses of their own that have yet to be discovered.) |
| 6. sadmind and
mountd |
| Sadmind allows remote administration access to Solaris systems,
providing graphical access to system administration functions. Mountd controls and
arbitrates access to NFS mounts on UNIX hosts. Buffer overflows in these applications can
be exploited allowing attackers to gain control with root access. |
Systems Affected:
Multiple UNIX and Linux systems
Sadmind: Solaris machines onlyCVE Entries:
sadmind - CVE-1999-0977
mountd - CVE-1999-0002.
Advice on correcting the problem:
A. Wherever possible, turn off and/or remove these services on machines directly
accessible from the Internet.
B. Install the latest patches:
For Solaris Software Patches:
http://sunsolve.sun.com
For IBM AIX Software
http://techsupport.services.ibm.com/support/rs6000.support/downloads
http://techsupport.services.ibm.com/rs6k/fixes.html
For SGI Software Patches:
http://www.sgi.com/support/path_intro.html
For Compaq (Digital Unix) Patches:
http://www.compaq.com/support
C. More guidance at:
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-99-16-sadmind.html
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-98.12.mountd.html
|
| 7. Global file
sharing and inappropriate information sharing via NFS and Windows NT ports 135->139
(445 in Windows2000) or UNIX NFS exports on port 2049. Also Appletalk over IP with
Macintosh file sharing enabled. |
| These services allow file sharing over networks. When improperly
configured, they can expose critical system files or give full file system access to any
hostile party connected to the network. Many computer owners and administrators use these
services to make their file systems readable and writeable in an effort to improve the
convenience of data access. Administrators of a government computer site used for software
development for mission planning made their files world readable so people at a different
government facility could get easy access. Within two days, other people had discovered
the open file shares and stolen the mission planning software. When file sharing is
enabled on Windows machines they become vulnerable to both information theft and certain
types of quick-moving viruses. A recently released virus called the 911 Worm uses file
shares on Windows 95 and 98 systems to propagate and causes the victim’s computer to
dial 911 on its modem. Macintosh computers are also vulnerable to file sharing exploits.
The same NetBIOS mechanisms that permit Windows File Sharing may also be used to
enumerate sensitive system information from NT systems. User and Group information
(usernames, last logon dates, password policy, RAS information), system information, and
certain Registry keys may be accessed via a "null session" connection to the
NetBIOS Session Service. This information is typically used to mount a password guessing
or brute force password attack against the NT target. |
Systems Affected:
UNIX, Windows, and Macintosh systems.CVE Entries:
SMB shares with poor access control - CAN-1999-0520
NFS exports to the world - CAN-1999-0554
These candidate entries are likely to change significantly before being accepted as full
CVE entries.
Advice on correcting the problem:
A. When sharing mounted drives, ensure only required directories are shared.
B. For added security, allow sharing only to specific IP addresses because DNS names
can be spoofed.
C. For Windows systems, ensure all shares are protected with strong passwords.
D. For Windows NT systems, prevent anonymous enumeration of users, groups, system
configuration and registry keys via the "null session" connection.
Block inbound connections to the NetBIOS Session Service (tcp 139) at the router or the
NT host.
Consider implementing the RestrictAnonymous registry key for Internet-connected hosts
in standalone or non-trusted domain environments:
NT4: http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/Q143/4/74.asp
Win2000: http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/Q246/2/61.ASP
E. For Macintosh systems, disable file sharing and web sharing extensions unless
absolutely required. If file sharing must be enabled, ensure strong passwords for access,
and stop file sharing during periods in which it is not required. http://www.cert.org/incident_notes/IN-2000-02.html |
| 8.
User IDs, especially root/administrator with no passwords or weak passwords. |
| Some systems come with "demo" or "guest"
accounts with no passwords or with widely-known default passwords. Service workers often
leave maintenance accounts with no passwords, and some database management systems install
administration accounts with default passwords. In addition, busy system administrators
often select system passwords that are easily guessable ("love,"
"money," "wizard" are common) or just use a blank password. Default
passwords provide effortless access for attackers. Many attackers try default passwords
and then try to guess passwords before resorting to more sophisticated methods.
Compromised user accounts get the attackers inside the firewall and inside the target
machine. Once inside, most attackers can use widely-accessible exploits to gain root or
administrator access. |
Systems Affected:
All systems.CVE Entries:
Unix guessable (weak) password - CAN-1999-0501
Unix default or blank password - CAN-1999-0502
NT guessable (weak) password - CAN-1999-0503
NT default or blank password - CAN-1999-0504
These candidate entries are likely to change significantly before being accepted as
full CVE entries.
Advice on correcting the problem:
A. Create an acceptable password policy including assigned responsibility and frequency
for verifying password quality. Ensure senior executives are not exempted. Also include in
the policy a requirement to change all default passwords before attaching computers to the
Internet, with substantial penalties for non-compliance.
B1. VERY IMPORTANT! Obtain written authority to test passwords
B2. Test passwords with password cracking programs:
For Windows NT: l0pthcrack http://www.l0pht.com
For UNIX: Crack http://www.users.dircon.co.uk/~crypto
C. Implement utilities that check passwords when created.
For UNIX: Npasswd, http://www.utexas.edu/cc/unix/software/npasswd
For Windows NT: http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/Q161/9/90.asp
D. Force passwords to expire periodically (at a frequency established in your security
policy).
E. Maintain password histories so users cannot recycle old passwords.
Additional information may be found at:
http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/passwd_file_protection.html
http://www.cert.org/incident_notes/IN-98.03.html
http://www.cert.org/incident_notes/IN-98.01.irix.html
|
| 9. IMAP and POP
buffer overflow vulnerabilities or incorrect configuration. |
| IMAP and POP are popular remote access mail protocols, allowing
users to access their e-mail accounts from internal and external networks. The "open
access" nature of these services makes them especially vulnerable to exploitation
because openings are frequently left in firewalls to allow for external e-mail access.
Attackers who exploit flaws in IMAP or POP often gain instant root-level control. |
Systems Affected:
Multiple UNIX and Linux systemsCVE Entries:
CVE-1999-0005, CVE-1999-0006, CVE-1999-0042, CVE-1999-0920, CVE-2000-0091
Advice on correcting the problem:
A. Disable these services on machines that are not e-mail servers.
B. Use the latest patches and versions. Additional information may be found at:
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-98.09.imapd.html
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-98.08.qpopper_vul.html
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-97.09.imap_pop.html
C. Some of the experts also recommend controlling access to these services using TCP
wrappers and encrypted channels such as SSH and SSL to protect passwords. |
| 10. Default SNMP
community strings set to ‘public’ and ‘private.’ |
| The Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) is widely used by
network administrators to monitor and administer all types of network-connected devices
ranging from routers to printers to computers. SNMP uses an unencrypted "community
string" as its only authentication mechanism. Lack of encryption is bad enough, but
the default community string used by the vast majority of SNMP devices is
"public", with a few "clever" network equipment vendors changing the
string to "private". Attackers can use this vulnerability in SNMP to reconfigure
or shut down devices remotely. Sniffed SNMP traffic can reveal a great deal about the
structure of your network, as well as the systems and devices attached to it. Intruders
use such information to pick targets and plan attacks. |
Systems Affected:
All system and network devices.CVE Entries:
default or blank SNMP community name (public) - CAN-1999-0517
guessable SNMP community name - CAN-1999-0516
hidden SNMP community strings - CAN-1999-0254, CAN-1999-0186
These candidate entries are likely to change significantly before being accepted as
full CVE entries.
Advice on correcting the problem:
A. If you do not absolutely require SNMP, disable it.
B. If you are using SNMP, use the same policy for community names as used for passwords
described in Vulnerability Cluster Number 8 above.
C. Validate and check community names using snmpwalk.
D. Where possible make MIBs read only. Additional information:
http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/cisintwk/ito_doc/snmp.htm#xtocid210315
|
A High Priority
Bonus Item for Windows Users and Administrators:
Various Scripting Holes in Internet Explorer and Office2000 |
| Recent virus attacks have illustrated how macro and script code
could spread easily through e-mail attachments, and people were admonished to avoid
opening potentially dangerous attachments. However, Windows users can also spread
malicious viruses without opening attachments. Microsoft Outlook and Outlook Express will
execute HTML and script code in an e-mail in their default installations. In addition,
several so-called ActiveX components are incorrectly executable from an e-mail containing
HTML and script code. Some of the vulnerable controls include the Scriplet.typlib (ships
with IE 4.x and 5.x) and the UA control (Office 2000). Other vulnerabilities arising from
the use of Active Scripting are that an e-mail could be used to install new software on a
users computer. A relatively benign virus known as the kak worm is already spreading
through these mechanisms. A malicious version of kak can be anticipated at any time. We
recommend that all users and administrators set Outlook and Outlook Express to read e-mail
in the "Restricted Sites Zone" and then further disable all Active Scripting and
ActiveX related settings in that zone. This is done in the Options dialog's Security tab,
but can be automated using System Policies. Microsoft has made patches available for the
individual problems and is readying a patch which will set the security settings in
Outlook, but apparently has no plans on fixing Outlook Express. |
Systems Affected:
All Windows systems with Internet Explorer 4.x and 5.x (even if it is not used) or Office
2000. Windows 2000 is not affected by some of the IE issues.CVE Entries:
CVE-1999-0668
CAN-2000-0329
Advice on correcting the problem:
http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/ms99-032.asp
http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/MS99-048.asp
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS00-034.asp
The fixes for the particular vulnerabilities discussed here are available from:
http://www.microsoft.com/msdownload/iebuild/scriptlet/en/scriptlet.htm
http://www.microsoft.com/msdownload/iebuild/ascontrol/en/ascontrol.htm
http://officeupdate.microsoft.com/info/ocx.htm
Set your Security Zone to restricted sites and then disable all active content in that
zone.
Apply the patch to Outlook as soon as it becomes available at:
http://www.officeupdate.com/2000/articles/out2ksecarticle.htm
Updating your virus detection software, while important, is not a complete solution for
this problem. You must also correct the flaws in Microsoft's software. |
| Perimeter
Protection For An Added Layer of Defense In Depth |
In this section, we list ports that are commonly probed and attacked. Blocking these
ports is a minimum requirement for perimeter security, not a comprehensive firewall
specification list. A far better rule is to block all unused ports. And even if you
believe these ports are blocked, you should still actively monitor them to detect
intrusion attempts. A warning is also in order. Blocking some of the ports in the
following list may disable needed services. Please consider the potential effects of these
recommendations before implementing them.
- Block "spoofed" addresses-- packets coming from outside your company sourced
from internal addresses or private (RFC1918 and network 127) addresses. Also block source
routed packets.
- Login services-- telnet (23/tcp), SSH (22/tcp), FTP (21/tcp), NetBIOS (139/tcp), rlogin
et al (512/tcp through 514/tcp)
- RPC and NFS-- Portmap/rpcbind (111/tcp and 111/udp), NFS (2049/tcp and 2049/udp), lockd
(4045/tcp and 4045/udp)
- NetBIOS in Windows NT -- 135 (tcp and udp), 137 (udp), 138 (udp), 139 (tcp). Windows
2000 – earlier ports plus 445(tcp and udp)
- X Windows -- 6000/tcp through 6255/tcp
- Naming services-- DNS (53/udp) to all machines which are not DNS servers, DNS zone
transfers (53/tcp) except from external secondaries, LDAP (389/tcp and 389/udp)
- Mail-- SMTP (25/tcp) to all machines, which are not external mail relays, POP (109/tcp
and 110/tcp), IMAP (143/tcp)
- Web-- HTTP (80/tcp) and SSL (443/tcp) except to external Web servers, may also want to
block common high-order HTTP port choices (8000/tcp, 8080/tcp, 8888/tcp, etc.)
- "Small Services"-- ports below 20/tcp and 20/udp, time (37/tcp and 37/udp)
- Miscellaneous-- TFTP (69/udp), finger (79/tcp), NNTP (119/tcp), NTP (123/tcp), LPD
(515/tcp), syslog (514/udp), SNMP (161/tcp and 161/udp, 162/tcp and 162/udp), BGP
(179/tcp), SOCKS (1080/tcp)
- ICMP-- block incoming echo request (ping and Windows traceroute), block outgoing echo
replies, time exceeded, and unreachable messages
|
| Signatories: |
Randy Marchany, Virginia Tech
Scott Conti, University of Massachusetts
Matt Bishop, University of California, Davis
Lance Spitzner, Sun Microsystems GESS Security Team
Alan Paller, SANS Institute
Stephen Northcutt, SANS Institute
Eric Cole, SANS Institute
Gene Spafford, Purdue University CERIAS
Jim Ransome, Pilot Network Services
Frank Swift, Pilot Network Services
Jim Magdych, Network Associates, Inc.
Jimmy Kuo, Network Associates, Inc.
Igor Gashinsky, NetSec, Inc.
Greg Shipley, Neohapsis
Tony Sager, National Security Agency
Larry Merritt, National Security Agency
Bill Hill, MITRE
Steve Christey, MITRE
Viriya Upatising, Loxley Information Services Co.
Marcus Sachs, JTF-CND, US Department of Defense
Billy Austin, Intrusion.com
Christopher W. Klaus, Internet Security Systems
Wayne Stenson, Honeywell
Martin Roesch, Hiverworld, Inc.
Jeff Stutzman, Healthcare ISAC
Ed Skoudis, Global Integrity
Gene Schultz, Global Integrity
Kelly Cooper, Genuity
Eric Schultze, Foundstone
Bill Hancock, Exodus Communications
Ron Nguyen, Ernst & Young
Lee Brotzman, DoJCERT, Allied Technology Group, Inc.
Scott Lawler, DoD Cert
Hal Pomeranz, Deer Run Associates
Bruce Schneier, Counterpane Internet Security, Inc.
Shawn Hernan, CERT Coordination Center
Kathy Fithen, CERT Coordination Center
Derek Simmel, Carnegie Mellon University
Jesper Johansson, Boston University
Dave Mann, BindView
Rob Clyde, Axent
David Nolan, Arch Paging
Mudge, @stake |
|
